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CASE COMMENTS 
THE NEW FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARD 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) 
Allison Sirica* 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Javaid Iqbal, a 
Muslim citizen of Pakistan, was arrested and detained in a maximum 
security prison in the United States as a person of “high interest.”1 A  a 
detainee, Iqbal alleged he was subjected to severe physical and verbal 
abuse, unnecessary and abusive strip and body-cavity searches, extended 
detention in solitary confinement, and interference with his ability to 
communicate with his counsel and to pray.2 Iqbal further claimed that he, 
like thousands of other Arab Muslims, was subjected to these harsh 
conditions solely because of his race, religion, or national origin and that 
his continued detention stemmed from a discriminatory policy created by 
high-level federal officials.3 As a result, Iqbal filed a claim4 in federal 
district court against numerous federal officials including John Ashcroft, 
former United States Attorney General, and Robert Mueller, Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, alleging he was deprived of various 
constitutional protections.5 
In response, Mueller and Ashcroft moved to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to show their involvement in the unconstitutional conduct.6 The 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. expected May 2010, University of Florida Levin College of Law. B.A., B.S., 2007, 
University of Florida. My deepest gratitude to all the editors, members and staff of the Florida Law 
Review, but especially Monica Wilson, Jon Philipson, Lisa Caldwell, Angie Forder and Professor 
Dennis Calfee for all of your insight, guidance and assistance during my tenure on the Review and 
for your dedication and commitment to the R view. Also, a special thanks to the many friends I’ve 
acquired during my three years in law school who have inspired me. This Comment is dedicated to 
my family: Andy, Amber, Aryn and Clay. 
 1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942–43 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 1944; see Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 
27, 2005), aff’d, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 3. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943–44; Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1. 
 4. Iqbal sought damages pursuant to the principles set forth in Bive s v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Court 
“recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged 
to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947–48 (quoting 
Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001)). In order to state a valid Bi ens
claim, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to show that the official adopted and implemented 
policies for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin. Id. at 
1948–49. 
 5. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1. 
 6. Ashcroft and Mueller sought dismissal on qualified immunity grounds, claiming that 
“[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions enjoy qualified immunity and are 
1
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district court denied the motion to dismiss reasoning the complaint alleged 
facts on which Iqbal could be entitled to relief.7 The Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the district court reasoning that Iqbal’s pleading was 
plausible and thus did not require factual allegations to amplify the claim.8 
On review, the Supreme Court rejected the appellate court and HELD, in a 
5-4 decision, that Iqbal’s complaint was insufficient to state a claim for 
purposeful and unlawful discrimination.9 
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8(a)(2) requires a pleader to set forth a “short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”10 The Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Conley v. Gibson11 emphasized that Rule 8 imposed 
only a simplified notice pleading standard.12 In Conley, African American 
railroad workers sued their union, alleging they were wrongfully 
discharged when they were fired and replaced by white workers.13 The 
union moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under 
Rule 8.14 The Court held the complaint adequately set forth a claim upon 
which relief could be granted under the Rule.15 In appraising the 
sufficiency of the complaint, the Court applied the accepted rule that “a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 
of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”16 The Court reasoned that 
since plaintiffs’ allegations, if proven to be true, would entitle the plaintiffs 
to relief, the complaint was sufficient.17 In its reasoning, the Court noted 
“the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out 
in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.”18 To the contrary, the 
Rules require only “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give 
                                                                                                                     
‘shielded from liability for civil damages’” so long as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established constitutional rights. Id. at *10. 
 7. Id. at *35. 
 8. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942, 1944; see Iqbal v. Hasty , 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 9. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954. 
 10. FED. R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2). 
 11. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), overruled in part by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007).   
 12. Id. at 47–48; see A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 
402 (Thomson West 2007). 
 13. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42–43. 
 14. Id. at 43. 
 15. Id. at 45. 
 16. Id. at 45–46; see Dabney D. Ware & Bradley R. Johnson, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, Inc.: Perverted Behavior Leads to a Perverse Ruling, 51 FLA. L. REV. 489, 499 (1999) 
(noting that pursuant to Conley, “a court granting a motion to dismiss must find that there are no 
facts which could be proven to support a finding of liability”). 
 17. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46. 
 18. Id. at 47. 
2
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the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds 
upon which it rests.”19  
The Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,20 reassessed the 
standard for evaluating the adequacy of pleadings under Rule 8, and 
appeared to endorse a new paradigm that imposed a higher burden on 
plaintiffs at the pleadings phase.21 The Court in Twombly concluded the 
pleading standard under Rule 8 demands more than the notice-pleading 
standard established in Conley.22 In Twombly, subscribers of various cable 
and Internet services brought a class action against telephone and Internet 
service providers alleging they engaged in a conspiracy in violation of § 1 
of the Sherman Act.23 Specifically, the subscribers claimed the service 
providers “engaged in parallel conduct” and “refrain[ed] from competing 
against one another” in order to inhibit competition among each other.24 
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, held the plaintiffs’ action must be 
dismissed under Rule 8 because the allegations did not give rise to a 
plausible inference of conspiracy.25  
According to Twombly, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”26 While the Court conceded that a complaint does not require 
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must include the grounds of his 
entitlement to relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions” or 
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”27 In other 
words, plaintiffs need to show they are entitled to relief by pleading 
allegations which plausibly suggest and are not merely consistent with 
their claim.28 According to the Court, the plaintiffs’ allegation in Twombly 
did not plausibly suggest the defendants engaged in a conspiracy29 because 
the allegations amounted to parallel conduct that, although consistent with 
an unlawful agreement, was more likely explained by free-market behavior 
than by unlawful conspiracy.30 The Court required plaintiffs to provide 
“further factual enhancement” in their pleadings in order to cross “the line 
between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.”31 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)).  
 20. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 21. Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1442786##.  
 22. Iqbal, 490 F.3d 143, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 23. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550–51. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. at 553–54, 570. 
 26. Id. at 570.  
 27. Id. at 555. 
 28. Id. at 557. 
 29. Id. at 564–66. 
 30. Id. at 553–54; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567, 
570). 
 31. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. 
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In the aftermath of Twombly, however, questions remained regarding 
the applicability, implementation, and scope of the opinion.32 Specifically, 
it was unclear whether the Court intended to confine the heightened 
pleading standard to complex litigation, such as the antitrust claim in 
Twombly, or whether the heightened pleading standard applied more 
generally to all civil actions.33  
The instant case clarified the uncertainty surrounding Twombly’s scope 
and application.34 In its analysis, the Court in Iqbal applied the “[t]wo 
working principles” that underlie its decision in Twombly and set forth a 
new two-pronged approach to assess the sufficiency of a complaint.35 
Furthermore, the Court unequivocally concluded that the Twombly 
pleading standard applies in all federal civil actions.36 
In the Court’s analysis, it first examined the “[t]wo working principles” 
of Twombly: (1) a complaint must do more than make legal conclusions; 
and (2) a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief.37  First, while 
courts must accept the truth of all factual allegations contained in a 
complaint, the same tenant does not apply to legal conclusions.38 
Accordingly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”39 While legal 
conclusions may serve as a framework for a complaint, they must be 
supported by factual allegations in order to be entitled to the assumption of 
truth.40 Second, the complaint must show, not merely allege, the 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Robert L. Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, LITIG., Spring 2009, at 1; 
Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Twombly Gets Iqbal-ed, TENN. B.J., July 2009, at 23, 23. 
 33. Posting of Ashby Jones to  Wall Street Journal Law Blog, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/05/19/why-defense-lawyers-are-lovin-the-iqbal-decision/ (May 19, 
2009, 13:07 EST). Twombly expressed concern about the “high cost of antitrust discovery to 
defendants, in dismissing an antitrust complaint for failing to sufficiently plead allegations of 
concerted action.” Larry Dougherty, Note, Does a Cartel Aim Expressly? Trusting Calder Personal 
Jurisdiction When Antitrust Goes Global, 60 FLA. L. REV. 915, 932 n.119 (2008). As a result, 
numerous lower courts determined the heightened pleading standard established in Twomblyonly 
applied to “‘expensive, complicated litigation’ like the antitrust conspiracy litigation claims in 
Twombly.” Posting of Yuri Mikulka to LawUpdates.com, 
http://www.lawupdates.com/tips/entry/iashcroft_v._iqbal_i_raising_the_federal_pleading_standa 
rd_for_plaintiffs_a/ (Aug. 18, 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 
2009); Filipek v. Krass, 576 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Ill. 2008); In re Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. 
KG Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2009)). Even when Iqbal came to the Second Circuit on 
appeal, the court noted that Twombly created “[c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning the standard 
for assessing the adequacy of pleadings.” Iqbal, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 
1937 (2009). 
 34. See Mikulka, supra note 33. 
 35. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50. 
 36. Id. at 1953. 
 37. Id. at 1949–50. 
 38. Id. at 1949.  
 39. Id. at 1949–50 (noting Rule 8 “does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff 
armed with nothing more than conclusions”). 
 40. Id. at 1950. 
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plausibility of the claim.41 In other words, “where the well-pleaded facts do 
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, 
the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘shown’—‘that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.’”42  
Combining Twombly’s two working principles, the Court set forth a 
new two-pronged approach for federal courts to apply in assessing the 
sufficiency of a complaint.43 First, a court should identify pleadings that are 
merely legal conclusions (therefore not entitled to the assumption of truth) 
and those that are factual allegations.44 Next, after identifying the 
complaint’s factual allegations, a court should assume their truth and then 
determine whether they are plausible.45 According to the Court, 
determining the plausibility of a complaint is a fact-specific task that 
requires a court to use its “judicial experience” and “common sense.”46 
In Iqbal, the Court applied the two-part test to evaluate the sufficiency 
of the complaint.47 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, found that the 
complaint failed to state a cause of action and should be dismissed.48 The 
Court began its analysis by identifying the allegations in the complaint that 
were not entitled to the truth presumption.49 Iqbal’s allegations that 
Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously 
agreed” to the discrimination, that Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of 
the policy, and that Mueller was “instrumental in adopting” the policy were 
deemed conclusory.50 The Court compared these allegations to the “bare 
assertions” plead in Twombly, reasoning they amounted to “nothing more 
than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional 
discrimination claim.”51 Accordingly, the Court determined the conclusory 
statements could not be assumed true.52  
The Court then considered the factual allegations in Iqbal’s complaint 
to determine their plausibility.53 In its analysis, the Court assumed true that 
Mueller and Ashcroft “arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim 
men” and approved the policy “of holding post-September 11th detainees 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). 
 43. Id.; see Mintz Levin, Appellate Advisory: U.S. Supreme Court Addresses Pleading 
Standard for Federal Civil Lawsuits in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, May 22, 2009, available at 
http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bdd79147-4847-4bfe-86e5-ae49025c7 
2c5. 
 44. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 45. Id.; see Mintz Levin, supra note 43. 
 46. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 47. Id. at 1951–52. 
 48. Id. at 1950–51. 
 49. Id. at 1951. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007)). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. 
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in highly restrictive conditions of confinement.”54 The Court, however, 
found these explanations did not plausibly establish Iqbal’s claim that he 
was detained because of his race, religion, or national origin.55 Instead, the 
Court focused on the “obvious alternative explanation” for Iqbal’s arrest 
and confinement.56 The Court emphasized that the perpetrators of the 
September 11th attacks were Arab Muslim hijackers who were members of 
al Qaeda, and that al Qaeda is comprised of Arab Muslims and headed by 
another Arab Muslim.57 Taking these factors into consideration, the Court 
found it was a more plausible conclusion that the government focused on 
Arab Muslims in the aftermath of September 11th because of their 
“potential connections to those who committed [the] terrorist acts” rather 
than because of outright discrimination.58 Accordingly, the Court reasoned 
that as between the nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who 
potentially had connections to terrorist attacks and the “invidious 
discrimination” Iqbal claimed, “discrimination is not a plausible 
conclusion.”59  
The Court noted that even if the facts did amount to a plausible 
inference that Iqbal’s arrest was the result of discrimination, Iqbal would 
still not be entitled to relief.60 To prevail in his action, Iqbal would need to 
allege facts plausibly showing that Ashcroft and Mueller purposefully 
adopted a policy that discriminated against him solely because of his race, 
religion, or national origin.61 The Court reasoned the complaint did not 
contain any factual allegation to plausibly suggest Ashcroft’s and Muller’s 
discriminatory states of mind.62 In fact, according to the Court, all the 
complaint “plausibly suggests is that the Nation’s top law enforcement 
officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep 
suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the 
suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.” Similar to its conclusion in 
Twombly, the Court found Iqbal would need to do more “by way of factual 
content to ‘nudg[e]’ his claim of purposeful discrimination ‘across the line 
from conceivable to plausible.’”63  
The decision in Iqbal has already been touted as one of the most 
significant decisions impacting civil pleadings,64 creating broad and far-
                                                                                                                     
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1951–52. 
 60. Id. at 1952. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  
 64. See Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits,  N.Y. TIMES, July 
21, 2009, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21bar.html (noting “Iqbal is 
the most significant Supreme Court decision in a decade for day-to-day litigation in the federal 
6
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reaching implications for both practitioners and parties to a federal civil 
lawsuit.65 First, in attempting to clarify the Twombly standard and setting 
forth a new two-pronged approach for evaluating pleadings,66 the Court 
may have actually created more uncertainty on how courts should evaluate 
the sufficiency of pleadings. Second, and most importantly, the present 
case clarified that Twombly applies to all federal civil cases,67 thereby 
expanding the heightened Twombly standard beyond complex or technical 
cases.68 
The clear tension between Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and 
Justice Souter’s dissent illustrates that applying the two-prong test may be 
more difficult for courts to undertake than it initially appears.69 As noted 
above, the first prong of the test requires a court to identify pleadings that 
are legal conclusions. At the outset, it is not entirely clear how a court 
should distinguish between a complaint’s legal conclusions, which are not 
entitled to the assumption of truth, and its legitimate factual allegations, 
which are entitled to the assumption of truth.70 For example, in the instant 
case, the majority and the dissent employed different standards to 
distinguish between legal conclusions and factual allegations. While the 
majority easily found that many of Iqbal’s allegations against Ashcroft and 
Mueller were too conclusory to be entitled to the assumption of truth,71 the 
dissent disagreed and found the same allegations were factual and indeed 
entitled to the truth presumption.72 What the majority classified as “bare 
assertions” and a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” the dissent 
characterized as factual allegations sufficient to state a claim for relief.73 
Even focusing on the majority opinion alone, it is difficult to reconcile the 
majority’s selection of certain allegations as conclusory with its treatment 
of other allegations as nonconclusory.74 For example, the majority deemed 
it nonconclusory, and took as true, that Mueller and Ashcroft “arrested and 
detained thousands of Arab Muslim men” and approved the policy “of 
holding post-September 11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of 
confinement.”75 Yet, the majority deemed it conclusory that Ashcroft and 
Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed” to that 
discrimination, that Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of the policy and 
                                                                                                                     
courts”). In fact, federal judges cited Iqbal more than 500 times in just two months following the 
Court’s ruling. Id. 
 65. See Mintz Levin, supra note 43. 
 66. Id.; see Liptak, supra note 64. 
 67. Mintz Levin, supra note 43.  
 68. Id.; Rothman, supra note 32, at 1. 
 69. Mintz Levin, supra note 43. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009); id. at 1959–60 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 1959–61 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 1960. 
 74. Id. at 1961. 
 75. Id. at 1951 (majority opinion); id. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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that Mueller was “instrumental in adopting” the policy.76 Unfortunately, 
the majority failed to provide reasoning of how to differentiate between the 
two sets of allegations, only declaring that the latter set of allegations are 
not entitled to the assumption of truth because of their “conclusory 
nature.”77 As the dissent illustrates, “there is no principled basis for the 
majority’s disregard of the allegations linking Ashcroft and Mueller 
to . . . [the] discrimination,” yet the majority’s acceptance of other 
allegations that similarly link Ashcroft and Mueller to the discrimination. 78  
Another difficulty presented in applying the two-prong test is 
determining whether a complaint’s factual allegations are plausible. As 
noted above, once a court determines a pleading’s factual allegations, it 
must determine whether the allegations are plausible. In the present case, 
the majority failed to establish parameters on how to apply the plausibility 
standard,79 instead leaving the plausibility determination to the “judicial 
experience” and “common sense” of district courts.80 Justice Souter, who 
authored the Twombly opinion, along with three other Justices, flatly 
rejected the Iqbal majority’s approach to evaluating Twombly’s plausibility 
standard.81 While the majority took into account the “more likely 
explanations” and the “obvious alternative explanation” to determine the 
plausibility of the claims,82 the dissent argued it is not a court’s place at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether the allegations are probably 
true.83 According to the dissent, a court must take all the allegations as true, 
no matter how skeptical it may be, unless the allegations are “sufficiently 
fantastic to defy reality as we know it.”84 As an illustration of claims that a 
court could properly deem improbable, the dissent pointed to “claims about 
little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in 
time travel.”85 Despite the majority finding otherwise, the dissent argued 
that Iqbal’s allegation that Muller and Ashcroft discriminated against him 
on account of his race, religion, or national origin is not unrealistic or 
nonsensical and, by itself, is sufficient to make a plausible claim.86 
The present case certainly leaves questions regarding the proper 
interpretation and application of Twombly’s plausibility standard when 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Id. at 1951 (majority opinion). 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 79. Mikulka, supra note 33. 
 80. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (majority opinion); see Caroline N. Mitchell, David S. 
Rutkowski, & David L. Wallach, United States: Ascroft v. Iqbal: The New Federal Pledging 
Standard, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEF, June 17, 2009, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp? 
articleid=81392. 
 81. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 82. Id. at 1951 (majority opinion). 
 83. Id. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1960. 
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evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. Not only is there a clear conflict 
between the Court’s majority opinion and the four dissenting Justices over 
what constitutes a plausible claim, but the Court creates greater uncertainty 
by leaving the plausibility determination to the “judicial experience” and 
“common sense” of district courts and permitting courts to look beyond the 
complaint to the surrounding factual context to establish whether a claim 
establishes plausibility.87 Many commentators have expressed concern that 
this may result in highly subjective judgments and inconsistent results 
among trial courts.88 Some have claimed the instant case enables district 
judges to “dismiss cases based on their own subjective notions of what is 
probably true,” which will inevitably create disparate and irreconcilable 
results.89 At least one legal commentator claims, however, that the judicial 
discretion the Court imposed on lower courts may not be as significant as 
many commentators believe.90  
Undoubtedly, the biggest impact the present case will have on 
practitioners and parties to federal civil lawsuits is its expansion of the 
Twombly pleading standard to all federal civil cases. Prior to Iqbal, some 
courts were reluctant to expand Twombly to all civil suits. Iqbal, however, 
unequivocally “expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’” 91 
suppressing any doubt that the Twombly standard should be limited to 
technical, complex cases.92 As a result, the instant case will  inevitably 
increase the number of motions to dismiss defendants will file, as well as 
increase the number of such motions that are granted.93 Defendants in all 
civil federal cases can now use Twombly’s plausibility standard as a 
powerful tool to obtain an early dismissal of a claim.94 By strengthening 
the “factual particularity that a plaintiff must allege in [all civil] 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Id. at 1950–51 (majority opinion); see Mitchell et al., supra note 80. 
 88. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950–51; see Liptak, supra note 64; Mitchell et al., supra note 80; 
Rothman, supra note 32, at 1; Posting of Jaya Ramji-Nogales to Concurring Opinions, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/08/re-reading-iqbal-a-new-take-on-the-12b6-
wars.html (Aug. 4, 2009 08:28 EST); see also Jason Barlett, Comment, Into the Wild: The Uneven 
and Self-Defeating Effects of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 73, 94–
97 (2009).  
 89. Rothman, supra note 32, at 1–2. 
 90. See Steinman, supra note 21. According to Steinman, although Iqbal recognizes a judge’s 
power to disregard “conclusory” allegations at the pleadings phase, this does not necessarily 
constitute a drastic shift from notice pleading. Before Iqbal, the notice-pleading regime gave judges 
some power to disregard allegations in a complaint. The critical question for judges was whether 
the pleading constituted “fair notice.” Post-Iqbal, judges must still determine whether certain 
allegations in a pleading should be disregarded if they determine the allegations are “conclusory.” 
Therefore, even after Iqbal, judges still must answer the crucial question of what a complaint must 
contain in order for an allegation to be accepted as true.  
 91. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
555–56 (2007)). 
 92. Rothman, supra note 32, at 1; Mintz Levin, supra note 43; Mitchell et al., supra note 80. 
 93. See Mikulka, supra note 33; Mitchell et al., supra note 80. 
 94. Mikulka, supra note 33. 
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complaint[s],”95 and in effect creating a universal heightened pleading 
standard under Rule 8, the Court makes it easier for defendants to dispose 
of a suit early in the litigation process.96 Indeed, the ruling makes it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to coerce settlements from defendants who wish to 
avoid the expensive costs of discovery.97  
By the same token, the decision may make it harder for plaintiffs to get 
past the pleading stage;98 thereby potentially quashing meritorious claims 
and “threaten[ing] the entire federal system of notice pleading.”99 The 
present case may even completely prevent legitimate claims from 
proceeding to discovery because plaintiffs may not have enough 
information at the pleading stage to plead sufficient plausible facts.100 
Whereas prior to Iqbal, plaintiffs could plead a general description of their 
claim and rely on the pre-trial process to uncover supporting evidence, post 
Iqbal, this option is no longer available.101 Instead, many plaintiffs will find 
themselves in a pleading dilemma.102 That is, plaintiffs will be required to 
include certain facts in their pleadings that can only be obtained through 
discovery.103 As a result, “potentially meritorious cases [may be] deterred 
or dismissed with the plaintiff never having had a chance to fully explore 
the evidence in support of the claim.”104 Particularly in cases such as the 
present case, which involve high-level governmental officials who “are 
likely to keep the details of their policies hidden from the public,” it may 
be difficult to obtain the evidence necessary to plead enough plausible 
facts.105 For instance, in Iqbal, it is not clear how Iqbal could obtain 
                                                                                                                     
 95. Mintz Levin, supra note 43. 
 96. Jones, supra note 33.  
 97. Mintz Levin, supra note 43; David G. Savage, Narrowing the Courthouse Door, A.B.A. 
J., July 2009, at 22; see Steinman, supra note 21 (noting “[i]f pleading standards are too lenient, 
plaintiffs without meritorious claims could force innocent defendants to endure the costs of 
discovery and, perhaps, extract a nuisance settlement from a defendant who would rather pay the 
plaintiff to make the case go away”). 
 98. Liptak, supra note 64.  
 99. Tom Kurland & Janelle Menendez, Supreme Court Previews: Ashcroft, Former Att’y 
Gen. v. Iqbal (07-1015) Appealed from the U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (June 14, 
2007) Oral Argument: Dec. 10, 2008, Fed. Law. Feb. 2009, at 52, 52–53. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 56 FED. 
L. 52, 52 (2009).  
 100. Rothman, supra note 32, at 1; Ramji-Nogales, supra note 88.  
 101. Kurland & Menendez, supra note 99, at 52; Mitchell et al., supra note 80. 
 102. Savage, supra note 97, at 22.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Posting of Howard Wasserman to PrawfsBlawgl, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfs 
blawg/2009/06/discovery-defaults-and-iqbal.html (June 2, 2009, 06:38 EST); see Steinman, supra 
note 21 06:38 EST); see Steinman, supra note 21 (noting “by increasing the federal pleading 
standards, meritorious cases could be dismissed at the pleadings phase without plaintiffs having the 
opportunity to engage in pretrial discovery that, if permitted, would confirm the case’s merit”). 
 105. Kurland & Menendez, supra note 99, at 52.  
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evidence that showed Ashcroft and Mueller discriminated against him 
without being able to question the officials and inspect documents.106  
Without a doubt, the present case drastically changes the landscape for 
federal pleading standards and signifies a new era for pleading standards in 
every civil case in federal court.107 By extending the heightened pleading 
standard to all civil actions, the case has broad, far-reaching implications 
for both practitioners and parties to a civil lawsuit in federal court.108 
Unfortunately, however, the Court in Iqbal fails to provide district courts 
with an adequate framework for evaluating the sufficiency of pleadings.109 
Consequently, district courts are left to wrestle with how to properly 
interpret and apply the new pleading standard, which will likely result in 
inconsistent outcomes based on the subjective notions of what trial judges 
believe is plausible.110  
In order to help limit the inconsistent results among district courts 
resulting from differing judicial interpretations of Iqbal’s new pleading 
standard, federal courts should interpret Iqbal as being consistent with 
Rule 8’s liberal notice pleading regime.111 Accordingly, in interpreting and 
applying the first-prong of the Iqbal pleading standard, courts should only 
dismiss claims which “merely parrot the statutory language of the claims 
that they are pleading.”112 On the other hand, courts should accept those 
pleadings which contain specific facts to support the plaintiff’s legal 
claims.113 Anything other than “abstract recitations of the elements of a 
cause of action or conclusory legal statements” should be entitled to the 
assumption of truth.114 In interpreting and applying the second prong of the 
Iqbal pleading standard, courts should only deny those factual allegations 
which are “so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient 
notice to defendants of the plaintiff’s claim.”115 While employing such a 
framework will not completely eliminate the judicial subjectivity Iqbal 
created, such an approach will allow courts to focus more on the merits of 
the claim “rather than on the technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of 
court.”116  
                                                                                                               
 106. Savage, supra note 97, at 22.  
 107. Rothman, supra note 32, at 2; Steinman, supra note 21.  
 108. Rothman, supra note 32, at 2.  
 109. Steinman, supra note 21. 
 110. See Rothman, supra note 32, at 2; Mitchell et al., supra note 80.  
 111. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580–82 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 112. Id. at 581. 
 113. Id.  
 114. See id. 
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 116. Id. at 580 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)). 
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